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We study the propagation of cascading failures in complex supply networks with a focus on non-
local effects occurring far away from the initial failure. It is shown that a high clustering and a small
average path length of a network generally suppress nonlocal overloads. These properties are typi-
cal for many real-world networks, often called small-world networks, such that cascades propagate
mostly locally in these networks. Furthermore, we analyze the spatial aspects of countermeasures
based on the intentional removal of additional edges. Nonlocal actions are generally required in
networks which have a low redundancy and are thus especially vulnerable to cascades.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k,89.20.-a,88.80.hh
I. INTRODUCTION
A reliable supply of electric power fundamentally un-
derlies the function of most of our technical infrastructure
and affects all aspects of daily life. Large-scale power out-
ages can thus have potentially catastrophic consequences
and cause huge economic losses [1, 2]. Therefore it is
an important goal to understand the vulnerability of a
grid on all scales in order to secure our energy supply. A
promising direction is to combine methods and models of
power engineering with the recent progress in the theory
of complex networks [3–6].
Notably, most large-scale outages can be traced back to
the failure of a single transmission element of our power
supply system [7]. The initial failure then causes sec-
ondary failures in other elements of the grid and even-
tually a global cascade. Cascading failures have been
analyzed in a variety of studies from the viewpoint of
mathematics and theoretical physics in the last decade
[8–19]. It has been analyzed which structural properties
of networks promote or prevent global cascades [8–13]
and how fluctuations and transient dynamics affect the
vulnerability of the grid [14, 15]. Different countermea-
sures were discussed in order to make a grid more robust
beforehand [16] or to stop a cascade before it affects ma-
jor parts of the grid [17–19].
Most of these studies adopt a global perspective on
cascading failures and focus on the statistical proper-
ties of the cascade and potential countermeasures. In
this article we study cascades from a more microscopic
perspective and analyze the location and propagation of
failures. In particular, we characterize the nonlocality
of secondary failures and show which structural features
determine the nonlocality during the propagation of a
cascade. It is shown that overloads occur mostly locally,
i.e. in the immediate neighborhood of the failing ele-
ment, when the network is strongly clustered and ‘small’.
Remarkably, these two features are found for many real-
world networks in technology as well as in biology and
sociology [20]. We then extend these ideas to analyze
the mechanism and the spatial aspects of countermea-
sures based on the intentional shutdown of transmission
elements [17, 19].
II. MODELS FOR CASCADING FAILURES
To analyze the spatial aspects of cascading failures in
complex networks we use a model introduced by Mot-
ter and Lai in [9, 17]. Related models were introduced
and discussed in [21–23]. The Motter-Lai model assumes
that at each time step, one unit of energy or informa-
tion is sent from each vertex to each other vertex in the
connected component along the shortest path. The load
of each edge Fij is then given by the number of shortest
paths running over this edge i↔ j, which is nothing than
the edge betweenness centrality [24]. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the capacity of each edge is proportional
to the load of the edge in the initial intact network,
Kij = (1 + α)F
(0)
ij , (1)
where the superscript (0) denotes the initial intact net-
work. The tolerance parameter α ≥ 0 quantifies the
global redundancy of the network: Each edge can trans-
mit (1+α) of its initial load before it becomes overloaded.
Then it is analyzed what happens if one edge is dam-
aged, such that it is effectively removed from the network.
Obviously, the other edges have to take over the load such
that Fij will generally increase. If the load exceeds the
capacity of an edge (i, j), Fij > Kij , then this edge be-
comes overloaded and also drops out of service, which
causes a further redistribution of the flows and further
overloads. This can trigger a large cascade of failures
disconnecting the entire grid. We note that the original
articles [9, 17] analyze potential overloads of vertices in-
stead of edges. However, in cascading failures of power
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Propagation of a cascade of failures in the British high-voltage power transmission grid. The cascade is
triggered by a single edge which drops out of operation (marked by an arrow). As a consequence, the network flow is rerouted
which causes overloads of further edges which also break down (thick black lines). Most interestingly, the overloads do not
occur in the immediate neighborhood of the removed edge. The network structure was taken from [15, 25] and the tolerance
parameter is α = 0.5.
grids, usually the transmission lines (i.e. the edges) be-
come overloaded and drop out of service. Therefore we
concentrate on edges instead of vertices in the present
paper.
An example of a cascading failure in the Motter-Lai
model is shown in Fig. 1 for the topology of the British
high-voltage transmission grid [15, 25]. The cascade is
triggered by the breakdown of one edge marked by an
arrow in the upper left panel of the figure. The cascade
then propagates through the network and finally leads
to a state where the network is decomposed into several
components.
A remarkable aspect of this example is that the cas-
cade is strongly nonlocal. The distance of the defective
edge causing the flow redistribution and the overloaded
edges is rather large. Therefore a local perspective is
not sufficient to evaluate the effects of the breakdown of
single edges in a complex network. In the following we
will analyze the spatial aspects of cascading failures in
detail and show which topologies are especially prone to
nonlocal failures.
On a global scale, the damage caused by a cascading
failure is generally quantified by the number of vertices
which are still connected when the cascade comes to a
halt. To be precise, we measure the number of vertices in
the largest connected component in the final state (called
G) as well as in the initial network (called G0). A high
value of the ratio G/G0 indicates that the network is still
mostly intact, while a low value value of G/G0 indicates
a fatal global cascade. Numerical results for the average
effect of cascading failures are shown in Fig. 2 (a,b) as
a function of the tolerance parameter α. Obviously the
size of the final cluster G/G0 increases with α – in gen-
eral, catastrophic global cascades are more likely in net-
works that lack redundancy, i.e. for low values of α. This
plot also shows which amount of redundancy is needed
in order to contain the possible effects to a maximum
acceptable value. How the network topology determines
these curves and thus the global robustness of a network
has been discussed intensively in the literature (see, e.g.,
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Resilience and nonlocality in cascad-
ing failures as a function of the tolerance parameter α. (a,b)
Relative size of the largest connected cluster after the cascade
G/G0, averaging over all possible trigger edges. (c,d) Aver-
age of the distance to the trigger edge for all overloaded edges
(dav(1), ◦) and for the edge which is nearest to the trigger
(dmin(1), ) for the first step of the cascade. The vertical
bars show typical values for the respective standard devia-
tion. Results are collected for all possible trigger edges in
the respective network: (a,c) the British power grid [15, 25]
and (b,d) a W/S network with N = 500 vertices, k = 4 and
q = 0.2 [20].
[8–13]). However, such an analysis does not reveal which
parts of the network are prone to outage and how a cas-
cade propagates on a microscopic level.
III. NONLOCALITY OF CASCADING
FAILURES
To analyze the nonlocality of failures in complex net-
works we must first specify the meaning of ‘distance’ in
a network. The distance da,b of two vertices a and b is
defined as as the number of edges in a shortest path con-
necting them [26]. Furthermore we need the distance of
two edges (a, b) and (c, d), which is defined as the num-
ber of vertices on a shortest path between the edges such
that
d(a,b),(c,d) = min
x∈{a,b},y∈{c,d}
dx,y + 1. (2)
In the following we denote by t the edge whose initial
break- down triggers the cascade and by ov(n) the set of
all edges overloaded at the nth step of the cascade. We
then analyze the distribution of the distances dt,e for all
overloaded edges e ∈ ov(n) as well as its average
dav(n) =
〈〈
dt,e
〉
e∈ov(n)
〉
t
. (3)
Furthermore, we analyze where the nearest overload oc-
curs during the nth step, i.e the minimum of the distance
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Propagation of a cascade of failures in
the British high-voltage power transmission grid. The color
color and the area of the symbols indicates the number of
edges that are overloaded at step n and located at a distance
dt,e from the trigger edge. (a) Data for a single cascade as
shown in Fig. 1. (b) Data collected for all possible trigger
edges in the same network. The blue line is the average dis-
tance to the trigger dav(n) and the red line is distance of the
nearest overloaded edge dmin(n).
between the trigger t and all edges e ∈ ov(n). This quan-
tity is calculated separately for each cascade and we take
the average over all potential trigger edges,
dmin(n) =
〈
min
e∈ov(n)
dt,e
〉
t
. (4)
The distance between overloaded edges and the initial
trigger edge is shown in Fig. 3 (a) for the example shown
in Fig. 1. Already in the first step n = 1 we observe three
overloaded edges at distances d = 3, 5, 7, i.e. at rather
remote locations. In the following we will concentrate on
this first step of the cascade which facilitates the under-
standing of nonlocal effects. In later steps n > 1 of the
cascade there are generally multiple failures occurring at
once. Further outages then occur due to the collective
redistribution of network flows and cannot be attributed
to a single cause alone. Quantifying the direct nonlocal-
ity of flow rerouting, i.e the nonlocality from one step of
a cascade to the next step, thus faces conceptual difficul-
ties except for step n = 1. The distance of overloaded
edges to the initial trigger edge shown in Fig. 3 accounts
for the indirect nonlocality of a cascade for n > 1, as it
includes the propagation over several intermediate steps.
The influence of the global redundancy of a network on
the nonlocality of flow rerouting is analyzed in Figure 2
(c,d). We plot the distance between the overloaded edges
and the trigger edge dav(n) and dmin(n) for n = 1 (the
direct nonlocality) as a function of the tolerance param-
eter α. The first quantity shows where typical overloads
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FIG. 4. (Color online) The position of overloaded edges after
the failure of a single trigger edge strongly depends on whether
the trigger belongs to a triangle (upper panels) or not (lower
panels). We plot a histogram of the distances to the trigger
edge for all overloaded edges (dt,e for all e ∈ ov(1), blue) and
for the edge which is nearest to the trigger (mine∈ov(1) dt,e,
red). Results are collected for all possible trigger edges in the
respective network: (a) the British power grid with α = 0.1
[15, 25], (c) a W/S network with N = 500 vertices, k = 4,
q = 0.2 and α = 0.1 [20].
occurs, while the latter quantity shows where the nearest
overload occurs. It is observed that the average distance
between overload and trigger dav(1) decreases strongly
as a function of the tolerance parameter α. In highly
redundant networks, i.e. for large values of α, a large
change of the flow Fi,j is needed to induce an overload.
Such changes are rare and occur almost exclusively in
the neighborhood of the trigger. The average distance
between trigger and overload dav(1) is small and the rare
cascades propagate ’locally’. In weakly redundant net-
works, i.e. for small value of α, already medium scale
changes of the flow Fi,j induce overloads. Such changes
occur frequently also in remote areas of the network. The
average distance to the trigger dav(1) is large and cas-
cades can be strongly nonlocal. Such events are hard to
predict and to contain.
IV. THE ROLE OF NETWORK TOPOLOGY
The network topology has a decisive influence on the
collective dynamics of complex networks, in particular
the spread of information or perturbations (see [24, 27,
28] and references therein). The nonlocality of cascades
of failures is essentially determined by two topological
features of the grid: (1) the size of the network which is
measured by the average shortest path length
L := 〈dx,y〉x,y (5)
where the average is taken over all pairs of nodes x, y
and (2) the availability of short redundant pathways in
the network. Such short paths are especially available if
the trigger edge belongs to a triangle [35]. On a global
scale the presence of triangles in the network is quantified
by the clustering coefficient [20]
C :=
3× number of triangles
number of connected triplets of vertices
. (6)
These conclusions hold for individual cascades in a given
network (cf. Fig. 4) and for average cascades in networks
with variable topology (cf. Fig. 5).
We first consider individual cascades for a given net-
work topology in more detail. When a single trigger edge
(a, b) breaks down, the flow Fa,b has to be rerouted via an
alternative path in the network. This may cause an over-
load and thus a secondary failure at another edge (i, j).
Such an overload can happen locally, i.e. in the direct
neighborhood of the trigger edge defined by d(a,b),(i,j) = 1
but also at a remote location in the network. The loca-
tion of potential overloads is determined by the location
of the alternative paths which take over the load. In
particular, a short alternative path is available when the
vertices a and b belong to a closed triangle (a, b, c) [35].
Then there is an alternative path of length 2 given by
a− c− b, which will take over most of the flow Fa,b when
the edge (a, b) fails. In this case it is very likely that an
overload occurs locally at the two edges (a, c) and (c, b).
A statistical analysis of individual cascades confirms
this claim. Figure 4 shows histogram of the distance be-
tween the overloaded edges and the trigger edge, where
we distinguish if the trigger belongs to a triangle or not.
Results are shown for all overloads as well as for the
nearest overload. If the trigger edge belongs to a tri-
angle (upper panels), the nearest overload occurs almost
always within the triangle, i.e. at a distance of one. Fur-
ther overloads can occur at different positions, but the
probability decreases strongly with the distance. On the
contrary, nonlocal overloads are much more frequent if
the trigger edge does not belong to a triangle (lower pan-
els). The highest number of overloads is found not in
the immediate neighborhood of the trigger edge but at
distance of d = 2 or d = 3. In this case the redistribution
of the flow Fab cannot be predicted within a simple local
picture.
To analyze how global structural properties of a net-
work determine the nonlocality of cascading failures we
simulate cascades for an ensemble of networks that in-
terpolate between regular and random structures intro-
duced by Watts and Strogatz [20], which are referred to
as W/S networks in the following. To generate such a
network one starts with a ring, where each of the N ver-
tices is connected to its k neighbors, k being the average
degree of the network. The total number of edges in the
network is thus given by Nk/2. Then a fraction q of all
edges is randomly selected, deleted and re-inserted at a
random position in the network. To reveal the influence
of the size L and the clustering coefficient C , we study
two cases in detail: (1) W/S networks with a fixed value
of k and different topological randomness q, which affects
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Nonlocality as a function of the network topology. (a,b) The average distance of the nearest overloaded
edge to the trigger dmin(1) decreases with the clustering coefficient C of the network. (c,d) The average distance of all overloaded
edges dav(1) increases with the average path length L. In panels (a,c) results are shown for W/S networks with fixed average
degree k = 4 and different values of the topological randomness q. The insets show how C and L scale with q. In panels (b,d)
results are shown for W/S networks with different degrees k = 4, 6, . . . , 20. The topological randomness q has been chosen such
that either the path length is fixed as L ≈ 6 in (b) or the clustering coefficient is fixed as C ≈ 0.4 in (d), cf. the insets. The
network has N = 500 nodes and α = 0.2.
both C and L simultaneously (Fig. 5 a, c) and (2) W/S
networks where where either C or L is kept constant by
varying k and q simultaneously (Fig. 5 b, d).
The position of the nearest overload is essentially de-
termined by the clustering coefficient C which measures
the probability that the trigger edge belongs to a trian-
gle. Indeed, we observe a strong decrease of the distance
dmin(1) with increasing clustering coefficient C (cf. figure
5 (a,b)). This holds regardless of the fact whether we
keep the degree k or the average path length L fixed.
The size of a network L obviously limits the distances
of vertices and edges. The numerical results plotted in
figure 5 (c,d) reveal a much stronger influence. The aver-
age distance of the overloaded edges to the trigger dav(1)
increases almost linearly with the average path length L.
Only for very small values of L does the distance satu-
rate slightly below the lower limit 1. This result holds
regardless of the fact whether we keep the degree k or
the clustering coefficient C fixed.
We conclude that nonlocal overloads are particularly
likely if the network is weakly clustered and has a large
average path length. Remarkably, many real-world net-
works from power grids to biological and social network
are so-called small worlds in the sense that both the clus-
tering is high and the average path length is low. This
small-world regime is recovered in the W/S network en-
semble for intermediate values of the topological random-
ness q [20]. Our results suggest the conclusion that such
small-world networks are particularly local in the sense
that the probability for nonlocal failures is smallest. This
result may provide an additional reason why many real-
world network have small-world properties (cf. the dis-
cussion in [29]).
V. PREVENTING CASCADES BY
INTENTIONAL REMOVAL
An effective counterstrategy for preventing global cas-
cades of failures is the intentional removal (IR) of parts
of the network [17, 19]. Similar actions are taken in real-
world power grids in case of an emergency. If the power
is no longer balanced in one part of the grid, for exam-
ple after a cascade of transmission line failures, several
consumers are actively disconnected (see, e.g., [30]). An
example for a successful application of this strategy is
shown in figure 6 where the removal of one additional
edge prevents the cascade completely. A statistical anal-
ysis of the effectiveness of IR in the Motter/Lai-model
is shown in Fig. 7 for a W/S network. We compare the
effect of an optimized IR to cascades triggered by the
breakdown of a single edge (called N − 1 errors) and
the uncorrelated simultaneous breakdown of two edges
(called N − 2 errors). Remarkably, IR can reduce the
number of disconnected vertices by more than 50% for
intermediate values of the tolerance parameter α.
Two basic mechanisms contribute to the effectiveness
of intentional removal. First, a small part of the network
can be intentionally disconnected by removing a single
edge. This is possible if this part of the network is con-
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Preventing a cascading failure by the intentional removal of a second edge within the Motter-Lai model.
(a) We consider a scenario where one edge breaks down. As a counter measure a second carefully selected edge is shut down.
The two edges are marked by arrows. (b) Without any counter measure the initial breakdown triggers a cascade of failures
fragmenting the network. (c) The cascade can be completely prevented if a second, carefully chosen edge is also shut down
(intentional removal, IR). When the two marked edges are removed simultaneously, no cascade takes place and the network
remains fully connected. The network structure was taken from [15, 25] and the tolerance parameter is α = 0.5.
nected to the rest through a single edge only, which is
then called a bridge [26]. In the Motter-Lai model each
vertex transmits one unit of information or energy to all
other vertices in the connected component. If several ver-
tices are disconnected they do no longer send or receive
information or energy from the rest such that the over-
all network flow decreases. This method can be used to
limit the consequences to a small local outage instead of a
global cascade. This can be very effective in practice, but
in any case parts of the network become disconnected.
However, in many cases there are much more sophis-
ticated methods to prevent or stop a cascade of failures.
An example is shown in Fig. 6, where the breakdown of a
single edge causes a cascade of failures leading to a strong
fragmentation of the network. On the contrary, the inten-
tional removal of another edge at a distance of 2 prevents
the cascade completely. In these cases the intentional re-
moval of an edge leads to a collective redistribution of the
network flows which is beneficial and improves network
stability. We conclude that the removed edge is actually
counterproductive as it degrades network stability. This
is analog to Braess’ paradox, where the addition of new
edges in a supply or traffic network worsens its opera-
tion or makes a network unstable [31–34]. Preventing
cascades by intentional removal can thus be seen as an
application of Braess’ paradox.
The effectiveness of optimal IR is further analyzed in
Fig. 7 (b) as a function of the tolerance parameter α for
a W/S network. For a low value of the α, IR is very ef-
fective in most cases and does not rely on the intentional
disconnection of parts of the grid. For the given network
topology, this holds for more than 90% of all possible
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
tolerance parameter α
(b)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 (a)
tolerance parameter α
si
ze
 o
f l
ar
ge
st
 c
lu
st
er
G
/G
0
FIG. 7. (Color online) Effectivity of intentional removal (IR)
for preventing cascading failures as a function of the tolerance
parameter α. (a) Relative size of the largest connected clus-
ter after the cascade G/G0 averaging over all possible trigger
edges. We compare cascades triggered by N − 1 errors (◦)
and uncorrelated N − 2 errors () to the effect of an opti-
mized intentional removal (). (b) Probability that IR leads
to an increase of the final cluster size without disconnecting
the network (green squares) in comparison to the probability
that IR has no effect (red diamonds) and that IR disconnects
the grid (blue circles). Results are collected for all possible
trigger edges in a W/S network with N = 500 vertices, k = 4
and q = 0.2 [20].
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Nonlocality of intentional removal
for preventing cascading failures. (a) Average distance of the
intentionally removed edge and the trigger edge as a function
of the tolerance parameter α. (b) Average betweenness cen-
trality of the intentionally removed edge as a function of the
tolerance parameter α. In (a,b) we disregard cases where IR
has no effect or disconnects the grid. The dashed line shows
the average shortest path distance L and the average cen-
trality, respectively, for comparison. (c,d) Histogram of the
distances of the intentionally removed edge and the trigger
edge in case that IR leads to an increase of the final cluster
size without disconnecting the network (green bars) for two
values of α Grey lines show the distance distribution for all
edges in the network for comparison. The red bars indicate
the probability that that IR has no effect and the blue bars
the probability that IR disconnects the grid. Results are aver-
aged over all trigger edges for a W/S network with N = 500,
k = 4 and q = 0.2. The dashed lines
trigger edges. For high values of α, most initial failures
do not lead to a cascade at all. Consequently, IR has no
effect with a very high probability – simply because it is
not needed.
There is a further significant difference between net-
works with high and low redundancy, respectively. In
Fig. 8 we analyze the characteristics of the intentionally
removed edge which optimizes G/G0. The betweenness
centrality of the intentionally removed edges is higher
than average, except for intermediate values of the pa-
rameter α (cf. [17]). Similar results are found for the
closeness centrality (not shown). Most interestingly, the
distance of the intentionally removed edge to the respec-
tive trigger edge decreases significantly with α. In the
case of low α the distance is approximately equal to the
average shortest path distance L, but for high α the dis-
tance is much smaller. In this case, cascades propagate
mostly locally such that they can be stopped by local
countermeasures.
This finding is further explicated in Fig. 8 (c,d) where
we plot a histogram of the distance removed-to-trigger as
well as the probability that IR has no effect for two values
of the tolerance parameter α. For α = 0.05, the distribu-
tion of the distance removed-to-trigger closely resembles
the distribution of the distance of two arbitrary edges.
This observation imposes the conclusion that the loca-
tion of the intentionally removed and the trigger edges
are uncorrelated to a large extend. On the contrary, the
distribution of distances decreases monotonically with a
small average for α = 0.5.
VI. CONCLUSION
Large-scale outages in complex supply networks are of-
ten caused by cascades of failures triggered by the break-
down of a single element of the network. It is thus essen-
tial to understand the propagation of cascades in order to
improve the stability of the power grids and the security
of our electric power supply.
In this article we have analyzed cascading failures in an
elementary topological model introduced by Motter and
Lai [9] from a microscopic perspective. We have shown
that nonlocal failures occur regularly for general network
topologies within this model. Such events are hard to
predict theoretically and potentially hard to prevent in
practice. Remarkably, nonlocal effects are strongly sup-
pressed in networks with a high clustering and small aver-
age path length. In such networks, including many exam-
ples from power grids to biological and social networks,
cascades propagate predominantly locally, i.e. from one
edge to an adjacent one.
One particularly effective countermeasure to stop or
contain cascades is the intentional removal (IR) of a care-
fully selected additional edge [17]. Two very different
microscopic scenarios were found depending on the tol-
erance parameter α, which measures the global redun-
dancy of the grid. If the tolerance parameter α is small
such that the network is vulnerable to cascades, IR must
be applied on a global scale. That is, the optimum edge
to be removed is generally located at a large distance
to the initially failing edge. On the contrary, cascades
propagate mostly locally in highly redundant networks
(large α) such that local countermeasures are generally
sufficient.
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